Cryptanalysis of the key memorandum of understanding tripartite n n Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) Resilience Key-compromise imitation imitation attacks on TAK-3: (Suppose A`s long-term secret key x is compromised to a adversary E. A: B: C: E is able to get by calculation E not to calculate, because they do not calculate that the notion of this attack is a partial compromise-key identity attack. Kryptoanalyse des dreiseitigen Schlüsselabkommensprotokolls n n n n Known-key security Forward Secrecy Known-key conspiracy attacks on TAK-2 : (1)A : A (2)B : (3)C : (1`)B : (2`)D : (3`)E : (1″)C : (2″)D : (3″)E : D E Schlussfolgerung Sicherheitsattribute von Al-Riyami-Paterson Protokoll K-CI K-KS UK-S TAK-1 Nein Nein TAK-2 Nein Nein Ja TAK-3 Nein Nein Ja Ja TAK-4 Kryptoanalyse von dreiseitigen und mehrparteien authentifizierten Schlüsselprotokollen Autoren: Kyung-Ah Shim , Sung Sik Woo Quelle : Informationswissenschaften, xxx 2006 xxx-xxx Sprecher : 洪翔 Datum: 2006/11/30 Review of Lee et al. -Partei AK n Lassen Sie G 1, G 2 sind zwei Gruppen der gleichen Hauptordnung. We tell the protocol that a card is a n-multi-linear card if it fulfills the following features: (i) If and , then (ii) The meaning of the card: If a generator is from. is not degenerate below is a Cryptanalysis generator of the trilateral key agreement n uncrypted unknown key attack on TAK-1: First, Opponents choose a random, calculate, , and get as their long-term keys receive their certificates, A: B: C: review of al-riyami-paterson tripartite key protocol (5/6) TAK-2 – TAK-3 Crypto-analysis of the tripartite protocol of key agreements n Known key attacks of insiders on TAK-3: B: C: the new meeting Review of Al-Riyami-Paterson`s tripartite key agreement protocols (4/6) n Protocol: A→B, C: a. P|| B → A, C: b. P|| C → A, B: c. P|| n the TAK key ration: (Below, H is an appropriate function of hachah) – TAK-1 Crypto-analysis of the tripartite key memorandum of understanding n Man-in-the-Middle-Attacks against TAK-2: Verification of Al-Riyami-Patersons n One Round Tripartite Authenticated Agreement tri agreement protocols (3/6) Protocols: A Identification Sequence: Signature of Ca: A`s long-term Public Key Key P: Short-term public value is long-term value, at the time of the introduction n tripartite proposed key authenticated protocols: Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed to provide key authentication implicit with the Joux protocol. Multiparty setting: Lee et al. expanded, assuming the existence of multilinear cryptographic forms. Subject: The three parties and multi-party parties have authenticated the key agreement against several active attacks (man-in-the-middle-attacks, keycomprome imitation attacks, known key attacks and unknown key-share attacks).
Review of the tripartite key agreement protocols of Al-Riyami-Paterson (1/6) n G 1 an additive group of the Prime Order q G 2 a multiplier group of the same order q Eligible pairing: is a map with the following characteristics: 1. Bilinguality: for all and for all 2.